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ABSTRACT  
Research on interorganizational partnerships (IOPs) points to high levels of information-sharing, mediated by 
interorganizational systems (IOS), as a determinant of value creation.  However, it is widely acknowledged that such 
interactions are characterized by opportunism, leading to transaction costs.  Interfirm trust has been posited as one 
mechanism for reducing transaction costs and promoting rich information sharing.  In this research-in-progress, we seek to 
understand the role of trust in facilitating information sharing in one form of IOS—electronic market access forums 
(EMAFs).  We draw on transaction cost economics (TCE) to suggest that the dominant trust-based mechanism in an EMAF 
exchange is contingent upon the nature of information exchanged.  This study will enhance understanding of how different 
types of trust influence information sharing in IOPs, and, potentially, offer guidelines on how EMAF providers can improve 
their margins by fostering different forms of trust-based governance. 
Keywords  
Interorganizational partnerships (IOPs), information sharing, trust, electronic market access forums (EMAFs) 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent research suggests that despite the efforts of buyers and suppliers to promote interorganizational information exchange, 
such “interactions are plagued by opportunism and appropriability problems” (Arikan 2009, p.672).  Consistent with theories 
of relational governance, these authors suggest that “solutions to these problems lie in the development of trust and norms of 
cooperation….” (p. 672)   Relational governance literature proposes interorganizational trust as an alternative governance 
mechanism that reduces transaction costs and improves relationship performance, while facilitating information exchange 
(Dyer and Chu 2003; Ireland 2007; Zaheer 1995).  
Reduced transaction costs and richer information exchange are promised by Internet-based interorganizational information 
systems (IOS) in the form of electronic market access forums (EMAFs) (Commins and Trigg 2000).  As enablers of 
knowledge creation, EMAFs can generate greater profits through consulting and more advanced use of online tools - but, a 
decade after the initiation of these types of enterprises, there is little evidence that buyers and suppliers perceive EMAFs as a 
venue for strategic information exchange (Grieger 2003). Moreover, some authors suggest that confidentiality and 
information security concerns may inhibit richer use of an EMAF, particularly since technologies exist to integrate 
interorganizational processes without the need for an intermediary (Power 2007).  This implies that trust mechanisms that 
encourage transactional information exchange may differ from trust mechanisms that facilitate strategic information 
exchange.  Given that trust has been shown to be critical in situations where undesirable outcomes are possible (Luhmann 
1979; Williamson 1985), we seek to understand the role of trust-based governance mechanisms in facilitating different 
classes of information exchange in EMAF environments.   
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) 
TCE provides a theoretical frame for examining interorganizational information flows. TCE proposes that “any transactional 
exchange between two parties (e.g. buyers and suppliers) is characterized by opportunism, where one party can take 
advantage of the other. The level of opportunism depends on the nature of the exchange environment…” (Grover et al.  2002, 
p. 218).   Concomitant with notions of opportunism is the assumption that organizations are boundedly rational—i.e. “limited 
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in their ability to receive, store, retrieve, and communicate information without error”—making it difficult to specify all 
contingencies surrounding an exchange (Grover et al. 2003, p. 459) .  Together, opportunism and bounded rationality give 
rise to transaction costs (Grover et al. 2003; Grover et al. 2002).  Transaction costs are higher in the face of high uncertainty 
and high asset specificity (Grover et al. 2003). Under these conditions, organizations are motivated to seek appropriate 
governance mechanisms that will reduce transaction costs (Williamson 1975). 
In the context of interorganizational partnerships (IOPs), an organization’s objectives for entering into an exchange 
relationship may be incongruent with the objectives of potential exchange partners (Bowen and Jones 1986).  This gives rise 
to partnership uncertainty (Bensaou and Venkatraman 1995) and uncertainty in the transactional environment (henceforth 
called environment uncertainty) (Grover et al. 2002), particularly when parties involved have unequal access to information 
surrounding an exchange (Bowen and Jones 1986; Choudhury et al. 1997). The higher the perceived level of uncertainty 
surrounding the IOP environment and/or potential exchange partners, the higher the transaction costs, in terms of risk, 
associated with sharing information.  
Asset specificity, in the form of information specificity, refers to the extent to which the value of information exchanged is 
restricted to its use by specific organizations (knowledge specificity) or within a specific time period (time specificity) 
(Choudhury et al. 1997).  Perceptions of information specificity are conditional upon characteristics of the information to be 
shared—i.e. range, quality, privilege, and its degree of coordination-relatedness (Malhotra et al. 2005).   For example, 
knowledge specificity is expected to be salient when information is high quality, broad, and extensively privileged, while 
time specificity is expected to be relevant with respect to information that is coordination related.   
Relational Governance 
Theories of relational governance build on TCE and add trust as an important dimension of buyer-seller relationships (e.g. 
Klein and Rai 2009).  For example, interfirm trust has been posited to lower transaction costs and lead to value-creating 
behaviors (Dyer and Chu 2003).  Notions of uncertainty and information specificity in IOP information sharing suggest that 
different levels or forms of trust may influence different types of information sharing.  This leads to the following research 
question: to what extent do different forms of trust influence information sharing in IOS-enabled IOPs? 
Trust in technology, as distinct from trust between IOPs, may also be germane to the study of IT-based information flows 
between buyers and suppliers (these are institutional trust and technology trust).  Trust in technology is made up of two 
distinct constructs (McKnight et al., 2009): (1) institutional trust refers to collectively held beliefs that outcomes will be 
successful due to the presence of supportive situations and structures (McKnight et al., 1998).  In the context of IOPs, these 
include beliefs that information flows are underpinned by appropriate structural safeguards such as contracts, guarantees, and 
regulations (McKnight et al. 1998); and (2) trust in a specific technology platform—note: while less established than 
institution-based trust, recent studies suggest that people do form trusting beliefs about specific technology attributes—i.e. 
consistency, functionality, and helpfulness—that influence technology use, independent of trusting beliefs relating to 
individuals or organizations (Lippert 2007; McKnight et al. 2009).  The context of IOPs provides an opportunity to 
empirically test this claim.   
The proposed research model (Figure 1), builds on aspects of Klein and Rai’s (2009) study of strategic information flows 
between buyers and suppliers in logistics supply chain relationships. These authors found that trusting beliefs about the 
benevolence, integrity, and ability of a receiving partner, positively influenced information sharing with partners.  The model 
also builds on Malhotra et al.’s (2005) work to propose that the nature of an organization’s trust in its partner will influence 
the nature of information shared between partners. To empirically test this proposition, we utilize 3 classes of information 
that may be shared among supply chain partners: 1) order; 2) operational; and 3) strategic.  We propose that the nature of 
information shared will be contingent on different forms of trust and will manifest in perceptions of willingness to share. 
Table 1 provides definitions for these and other constructs used in this study. In the next section, we develop hypotheses 
based on our research question.  Then, we propose an appropriate methodology for testing the research model.  
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Figure 1: Research Model 
 
Construct Defined as Comprising Defined as 
Nature of 
information 
shared 
(Seidmann and 
Sundararajan 
1997)   
The class of private 
information shared 
between supply chain 
partners  
Order Transactional exchange information 
Operational  
Production-related information about resource conditions and 
plans 
Strategic Financial and marketing related information  
Institutional 
Trust 
(McKnight et 
al. 1998) 
Beliefs that outcomes 
will be successful due to 
the presence of 
supportive situations and 
structures 
Structural 
Assurances 
Beliefs that transactions are underpinned by appropriate 
structural safeguards such as contracts, guarantees, and 
regulations 
Trust in a 
specific 
technology 
platform 
(based on 
McKnight et 
al. 2009) 
“a willingness to depend 
on a specific technology 
in a given situation in 
which negative 
consequences are 
possible” (McKnight et 
al. 2009, p. 6) 
Trusting 
beliefs 
Beliefs that the technology platform has the features to 
complete a required information sharing transaction 
(functionality); will operate consistently (consistency); and  
has an adequate and responsive IT support function 
(helpfulness) 
Interfirm trust 
(based on Dyer 
and Chu 2003; 
Lippert 2007) 
“one party’s confidence 
that the other party in 
the exchange 
relationship will not 
exploit its 
vulnerabilities” (Dyer 
and Chu 2003, p. 58) 
Reliability 
The partner organization will “reliably make good faith efforts 
to behave in accordance with prior commitments” (p. 58) 
Fairness 
The partner organization “makes adjustments in ways 
perceived as “fair”” (p. 58) 
Goodwill 
The partner organization “does not take excessive advantage of 
an exchange partner even when the opportunity is available” 
(p. 58) 
Table 1: Construct Definitions 
HYPOTHESES 
The nature of information shared in IT-enabled IOPs gives rise to uncertainty and information specificity.  Order information, 
while private, refers to information contained in routine transactions, such as order quantities and prices (Seidmann and 
Sundararajan 1997). The primary focus of this type of information sharing is on reducing order cycle times.  Consequently, 
uncertainty faced in this type of exchange relates to attributes of the technology platform, rather than to attributes the 
exchange partner: for example, whether the technology platform has the necessary attributes for storing and processing order 
information in a timely manner.  Formally stated:  
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H1.  Organizations that exhibit a high willingness to share order information will exhibit a high level of technology trust, 
while those that exhibit low willingness will not. 
Operational information sharing is focused on exploiting expertise across organizational boundaries (Seidmann and 
Sundararajan 1997).  Information shared is moderate in breadth, moderately privileged and moderately coordination-related 
(e.g. inventory level information).  In addition to technology concerns, organizations engaged in these types of relationships 
must mitigate against the risk of placing interorganizational processes, such as managing inventory, outside of organizational 
boundaries.  For this reason, we propose that organizations that exhibit a high willingness to share operational information, 
will exhibit a high level of institutional trust, while those that exhibit low willingness will not. 
H2. Organizations that exhibit a high willingness to share operational information, will exhibit a high level of institutional 
trust, while those that exhibit low willingness will not. 
In strategic information sharing, information relating to future plans and needs is exchanged, transmitted, and jointly 
developed by both the buyer and supplier (Grieger 2003).  Knowledge specificity is extremely high because information 
exchanged is broad in range, extensively privileged, and of high quality (Malhotra et al. 2005). Knowledge specificity gives 
rise to partnership uncertainty over and above features of the technology and institutional structures. Consequently, we expect 
that a high level of interfirm trust to be a prerequisite for this type of information sharing.  Formally stated: 
H3. Organizations that exhibit a high willingness to share strategic information, will exhibit a high level of interfirm trust, 
while those that exhibit low willingness will not. 
METHOD 
Due to practical difficulties in data collection, the majority of prior research is based on data collected from only one party in 
the IOP (e.g. Malhotra et al. 2005).  A notable exception in the IS literature is Klein and Rai’s (2009) study that utilizes 
dyadic data.  Klein and Rai’s study provides an exemplar on implementing dyadic research designs. Klein and Rai adopted a 
“focal supplier” collection strategy. For this study we propose collecting data from clients (both buyers and suppliers) who 
participate in electronic market access forums (EMAFs) that provide a full-range of services covering the classes of 
information sharing identified here. Example EMAFs include Ariba, Perfect Commerce, etc.  
Because the proposed constructs are perceptual in nature, a survey with valid psychometric properties is expected to be a 
suitable data collection method (Malhotra and Grover 1998).  Measures for theoretical constructs and controls will be adapted 
from existing scales, wherever possible. This means conducting a literature search to generate sample items. The population 
of interest is clients (both buyers and suppliers) who participate in an EMAF.  Because of the cross-sectional nature of our 
data collection, we will not demonstrate causality definitively. The construction of a sample frame from the relevant 
population as well as probabilistic sampling methods will support the external validity of our study (Berkowitz 1982). Every 
attempt will be made to collect dyadic data.  However, because information sharing between buyers and suppliers in these 
environments is mediated by the EMAF vendor, the sample should be evaluated for differences between buyers and suppliers 
to determine if a dyadic model is appropriate or if, in a mediated environment, it is more appropriate to evaluate EMAF 
clients in general (Malhotra and Grover 1998).   
Validation of the survey instrument prior to administration is critical both to ensure validity of conclusions as well as to 
develop and validate measures of the less well-defined constructs in our study (trust in technology, trust in a supply chain 
partner) (Straub et al. 2004).  Prior to developing the instrument, we will conduct expert interviews with EMAF clients as 
well as EMAF representatives to tighten our operational definitions and to ensure constructs are appropriately translated from 
theory to measurement (Malhotra and Grover 1998).  Item construction will be conducted to minimize bias and ambiguity, 
with additional purification and validation of items provided by pretesting (Podsakoff 2003). Measurement and structural 
models will be tested using a components-based approach, such as PLS.  PLS is preferred because this is an exploratory, 
prediction-oriented, study and PLS maximizes the variance explained in endogenous variables (Teo et al., 2003; Klein and 
Rai, 2009). Moreover, it is difficult to achieve large sample sizes with dyadic data (Klein and Rai, 2009).  PLS is particularly 
suitable for testing relationships with smaller samples. Instrument validity (convergent and discriminant) will be evaluated 
through confirmatory factor analysis (Churchill 1979; Kerlinger 2000).  Model fit, alternative model testing, and model 
solutions will be used to verify the relationships between constructs to test our hypotheses, and to lend support for causal 
inferences (Malhotra and Grover, 1998). The procedure for controlling common method variance is not the same in PLS as in 
covariance-based SEM. This is because, in PLS, indicators are weighted and summed without partialing variance.  In the 
absence of a formal method for controlling common method variance in PLS, we will conduct Harman’s single factor test.  
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To limit the potential for statistical conclusion error we will target a sample size that provides sufficient power. A rule of 
thumb for sample size is 100 or 5 multiplied by the number of variables in the model. To maximize sample size potential 
respondents will be contacted on multiple occasions to improve response rates.  Non-response bias will be assessed by 
comparing early and late responders (Dillman 2009; Malhotra and Grover 1998).   
LIMITATIONS 
One limitation of the proposed research model is that it does not include partner exchange objectives.  Exchange objectives, 
as defined by Malhotra et al. (2005) span a continuum between purely efficiency-oriented to efficiency combined with 
knowledge creation (Malhotra et al. 2005).  Because we anticipate that EMAFs will be motivated by higher profits to move 
their clients into higher knowledge creation services, partner exchange objectives may be a relevant construct to incorporate 
directly into future research models.  In particular, future research can explore how these objectives impact the relationships 
between different trust mechanisms and the nature of information shared within the EMAF context.  In addition, our 
conversations with EMAF providers, suggest that a large proportion of EMAF clients “convert” relationships—i.e. by 
moving existing buyer-supplier contracts into the EMAF systems to increase efficiency and to take advantage of other EMAF 
value-adding services.  This leads us to the intriguing possibility of investigating how the nature of trust and information 
shared differs in relationships that originate within the EMAF environment as compared to those that transfer into the EMAF 
environment. 
CONCLUSION 
Assuming the proposed hypotheses are supported, this study will have implications for relational governance research and 
practitioners involved in designing and managing EMAF services.  First, the development, validation and testing of measures 
of interfirm trust, as well as trust in technology, opens up possibilities for future research on buyer-supplier relationships in 
EMAF and other IOS-enabled contexts. Second, this study furthers understanding of the contingent role of trust in IOS 
adoption and use by revealing what elements of trust are necessary to make optimal use of information exchanged between 
organizations.  Finally, if these hypotheses are supported, these findings may form the basis for potential design changes to 
existing EMAF environments that will encourage the exchange of richer, more privileged, information. Moving a portion of 
clients from a predominantly operational efficiency focus towards strategic information exchange could improve EMAF 
margins and attract new segments of clients.   
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